Good morning, everybody. For those joining from overseas, good afternoon and good evening. My name is Kevin Dockrell. I’m an Institutional Portfolio Manager for RBC Global Asset Management. I’d like to thank you all for joining us here today for our Winter 2021 Emerging Markets Outlook Webinar entitled Headwinds or Tailwinds.

By way of background, RBC Global Asset Management manages over $390 billion with 23 specialist investment teams located all around the world. As you hopefully see today, emerging markets is an area which we have particularly deep expertise and experience. Indeed as a firm, we manage over $32 billion in EM equities and EM fixed income combined.

I am delighted to be joined by representatives from both our emerging equity team and our emerging market debt team today. Our speakers today are Polina Kurdyavko, Partner, Head of Emerging Market Debt, Senior Portfolio Manager at BlueBay Asset Management; Laurence Bensafi, Portfolio Manager and Deputy Head of Emerging Market Equities at RBC Global Asset Management; Mihai Florian, Senior Portfolio Manager at BlueBay Asset; and Richard Farrell, Portfolio Manager for Emerging Market Equities at RBC Global Asset Management.

And before we get started, a couple of items of housekeeping. First of all, as you can see, we’re all dialed in from our work-from-home locations, so please bear with us with any connection issues or IT glitches. Forgive us for any attempts to speak on mute, and apologies in advance for any cameo appearances from any young children or pets or any other unexpected visitors to appear on screen over the course of the next 30 or 40 minutes.

More importantly for our audience members, I’d like to urge you to please ask questions as we go along, and the instructions for how to do so should be on screen now. We’ve left plenty of time for Q&A at the end, and we’ll do our very best to answer as many questions as we possibly can as we go.

So without further ado, why don’t I kick things off with a question for our panel? 2020 was clearly a year like no other and emerging markets were not immune from the volatility that we have seen both on the downside and on the upside. What have been your key takeaways from a tumultuous year and how does it shape your market outlook for 2021? And I’ll pass to Polina to get us started.

Thank you very much, Kevin. It’s great to be with you and my colleagues in this virtual forum. While emerging debt has not—or rather, emerging market countries are not out of the woods when it comes to COVID, we feel that emerging market economic recovery has decoupled from the COVID management through 2020.

Last year, emerging market debt has delivered a number of surprises to investors. On the fundamental side, we’ve seen emerging market economists adding less debt than their developed market counterparts, but 9% increase of debt to GDP compared to 22% increase of debt to GDP for developed markets. And at least a dozen of EM countries have registered positive growth. Now, of course, the most significant recovery has been driven by China.

On the corporate side, we have seen positive surprises when it comes to default in the recoveries. Default in EM high-yield corporate debt has been less than half of the rate of default in U.S. high-yield debt. And equally interesting, is the recovery pattern where recovery and default of credits in emerging markets have been more than double the recoveries in defaulted U.S. high-yield credits.

So looking at 2021, what could be the surprises for us this year? We feel that on the liquid side, emerging market local currency debt can outperform emerging market hard currency debt for the first time in ten years. This view is supported by tailwinds that we’re seeing for the performance of local currency in emerging markets. In particular, the combination of U.S. negative rates, which are at the lowest point over the last 30 years, combined with positive current account dynamics in major emerging market countries, acts as a magnet to capital into the local markets. Not, of course, to mention the fact that having seen the 50% nominal devaluation in EM FX over the last 10 years and strong real rates valuation in the local currency debt look more appealing on the relative basis compared to the hard currency.

We feel that should that trend materialize that would be truly a surprise for emerging market investors given their cautious stance on the asset class that has delivered quite volatile and often suboptimal returns through the last 10 years.

If we look on the emerging markets’ banking sector, we’ve seen the sector much more resilient than in previous crises and that is both at the local level, regional level, or at the global financial institution level. This, coupled with government supports, it led emerging markets having a good access to credit.

In the second half of 2020, we started to see banks increasing their nonperforming loan provisioning and this—while this increase is driven both from what they see on their loan book performance, on an absolute basis we still see the provisioning still low. And while we expect some emerging markets corporates to experience stress and restructuring situations, we do expect the overall default ratio to remain subdued in 2021.

The least affected regions are expected to be Asia, which from a market perspective is expected to recover the first, followed by Central Eastern Europe, Middle Eastern Africa, while still at single digits Latin America is expected to see their highest default ratio on the corporate side. Overall, as a continuation from 2020, we expect in 2021 less credit appetite from the banking sector and more capital being provided by both the public and the private credit markets. We expect the move towards private credit and investor appetites to increase for locked-up capital structure in their continuous hunt for yield.

Thanks, Mihai. Maybe staying at the company level, but switching from the debt part of the capital structure to the equities, Laurence, is there anything that you’d like to add?

Yeah. Thanks, Kevin. Agree, 2020 was really an extraordinary year with, in the end, a very strong performance with emerging market equities up about 18% actually outperforming developed market equities. I guess post the announcements regarding the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines in November 2020 and also the election of Mr. Biden in the U.S., which means that we can expect better relationship with China and a very large economic stimulus is now expected, they were game-changers really for emerging market equities.

So after 10 years of underperformance, we could see emerging markets start to outperform developed markets on the back of a better economic growth differential and a weaker U.S. dollar which have been really the two main drivers for equity performance over the past years. The asset classes on their own and we could see laggards catching up with some of the sectors which has financials, materials, and industrials, in general, cyclicals doing well.

There are risks though. We may see a slow deployment of the vaccines in emerging markets, and the developed market may look better on that front. The other point is that markets have been very strong already this year with already about a 7% return. And valuations are not as attractive as they used to be. We are now well above the long-term median and the rally seems a little bit overextended after 80% return since the bottom in March 2020.

We have had massive inflows into the asset class over the past three months, and last week was the largest ever weekly inflow at close to $8 billion. Overweight and huge market equity is a concern just which always makes me nervous even though there’s a strong place for emerging markets continuing to outperform.

So I think over the short term there’s a risk for correction because expectations are really high, especially for GDP growth when actually we still have restriction and lockdown in quite a lot of countries. The market also has been very narrow.

And so overall I’m positive for 2021, but over the short term we may see some volatility, Kevin.

Thank you, Laurence. One thing you mentioned was the impact of the U.S. election and the victory of Joe Biden, clearly very topic at the moment with inauguration day tomorrow. The consensus is it appears that this is quite positive for emerging markets.

Richard, is that something—a view that you would echo? Or do you have anything else to add on that impact?

Yeah, absolutely. I think from an emerging market equity perspective, the U.S.-China relationship is really important. China now makes up over 40% of our benchmark, and I think when we think of the relationship really focused on trade tariffs, sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals and also on restrictions on investing into Chinese companies, I think our view is really that with the Biden administration we think the risk of further escalation is a lot lower. That said, these moves against China has been a cross-partisan issue, one of the few bipartisan issues in the U.S. So we don’t see a significant reduction in these tariffs and sanctions in the near term. We think it would be difficult for Biden to do that and not look weak initially in his presidency.

The positive thing is more on the fact that the Democrats have taken the senate. So today we’ve got Yellen, the nominee for the treasury secretary talking about a potential $1.9 trillion stimulus package. And from our perspective that means a much larger fiscal deficit in the U.S. or continuation of the high fiscal deficit that would be U.S. dollar negative and thus emerging market positive, particularly the value and commodity countries.

And then the final point I think is that if that stimulus goes into green infrastructure, a so-called Green New Deal, then that has potential to be very positive for China and Korea in particular as they’re the market leaders globally for the manufacture of wind, solar, and battery technology. So that could be a real positive as well.

And I guess from the fixed income side the only point that I would add is even more so than on the equity front the fiscal policy mix and the monetary policy mix is key. And I would agree with Richard that in the U.S. the policy makers will do whatever it takes to ensure that they provide accommodative stance until the signs of growth recovery are clear and sustained. This is a Goldilocks environment for EM.

However, when it comes to the U.S. and China relationship, while we might see less Twitter feeds, we feel the underlying tensions are still there. And in our view, the sanctions were deliberately vague to perhaps discourage the broader investments in China. So for us, 2021 would be a key year to monitor the negotiations between the two governments to assess to what extent the two countries can reach an agreement and lower the tension, the sanction pressure a bit.

Great. Maybe moving that lens a little bit, we talked a little bit previously about fiscal policy, also monetary policy. Clearly, one area that will be affected by a lot of these changes will be the currency markets. And EM FX has been a challenging asset class, to say the least, for a number of investors, many of whom have experienced poor performance in EM local markets. Conscious of the fact that we’ve had a number of false dawns over the last few years, are we now at a point where EM currency should be viewed more as a tailwind rather than a headwind going forward?

Richard, I know this is an area that you’ve done a bit of work on. Maybe I’ll go to you first on this question.

Sure, yeah. So again for us on the equity side, our focus is really on the North Asian currencies and that’s because if you add China, Korea, and Taiwan together, those three countries now make over 60% of our benchmark. When we look at those currencies, I mean last year they were surprisingly strong, up over 5% each against the U.S. dollar, and that contrasted very much with the rest or most other—the other emerging market currencies.

Going forward, we still think that despite their rich valuation, we think that the won, the renminbi, and the Taiwanese dollar will continue to be strong, and that’s because of the positive real rates, particularly in China. We’ve seen very large—an increase in current account surpluses for those countries and also, they have relatively low fiscal deficits compared to the U.S. and other emerging market currencies.

In terms of the other currencies, I’ll let Polina talk to that because I know they’re a larger part of the EM debt universe.

Thanks, Richard. I would add that generally and historically, FX performance correlates to growth. And of course, naturally, it’s the highest growth countries that we would expect to see the best performance in FX from, hence, the Asian region really stands out in that respect.

However, if we think about the rest of EM FX universe, often it would be the fear of past performance that hold investors back rather than uncertainty on the future given the strong tailwinds that we outlined at the very beginning of the presentation. And if we look at the real rates argument, it stands quite strongly across all EM economists, not only the Asian region.

Again, looking at EM FX performance outside of Asia, the FX in LatAm (Latin America) and EMEA region has underperformed significantly over the last 10 years, registering over 50% nominal devaluation.

We feel that the market is set to perform well on the local currency side. But of course, the question is what can derail it? Now, firstly, much faster turn in the fact policy, and I know a lot of investors are focusing on 2018 as a replay risk that we can witness this year. We feel that growth is way too weak to ensure a more [hawkish] stance from the Fed. And secondly, EM specific stories. If we see a fundamental country as significant enough in the countries, for example, like South Africa, that’s where we could see a local currency underperforming significantly in that particular story. The only key difference that I would mention between now and 10 years ago is a much bigger presence of the domestic local market community that are dedicated buyers of local currency debt.

Thanks, Polina. Mihai, your focus is more on the hard currency side with the liquid loan market, but how do you view FX risk in the context of the investments that you’re looking at?

Sure, Kevin. Just to add from the corporate credit side, when we look at this asset class we’d really want to focus on the underlying credit risk because ultimately even the largest borrower in the emerging markets there is limited liquidity for the emerging market for their local currency debt. Moreover, we’ve seen that local currency adding an additional risk element when considering investing in emerging markets corporates, that for a longer holding period affects performance mostly in a negative way.

Now, when we look at emerging markets corporates, we’ve seen that they’ve been living with a devaluation of their local currencies probably for the past 20 to 30 years. And both companies, but also sectors, they’ve been adapted to this. So for example, if I looked at the infrastructure sector we’ve seen that most of the underlying contracts being for bridges or your hospitals, they are under hard currency contracts. If we look at the telecom companies, even though they do have revenues in local currency, we see that there is an almost immediate path through of any devaluation from the dollars or euros into the local currency almost on a week- by-week basis.

Great. Polina, is there anything you’d like to add on that front?

I think the key for us in understanding the impairment that currencies can create on corporate balance sheets is the pace of devaluation. As Mihai has mentioned, most companies can manage gradual devaluation. It’s three to four times sharp devaluation which creates a different default cycle. And the biggest change in EM over the last 10 years has been a more orthodox policy mix with a lot more current countries implementing floating currency regime exactly to avoid what has happened in ’97, ’98 in Asia.

Great. Thank you. Also, I’m seeing lots of questions coming through from our audience. We will get to those very shortly. And still, there’s lots more time for more questions, so please do use the chat button at the end of your screens.

One more question from my side. One thing that we’re seeing is the letters E-S-G are gaining a lot more traction in the asset management industry more broadly in recent years. I guess ESG hasn’t necessarily been something that investors naturally associate with emerging markets investing.

Laurence, is it possible for these two things to go hand in hand?

I mean, this is interesting as at RBC it is something we always paid attention to, as we believe that a company with its stakeholders being employees, minority shareholders, or the environment [to be] one we expected better in the future compared to companies which are cutting corners. That may help in the short term, but will hurt longer term.

I guess this view is now becoming mainstream, and as a consequence, companies are accelerating their efforts in improving ESG across all EM countries and sectors.

A country such as Korea is probably a very good example and quite unexpected, I guess. The country’s stock market has always been one of the cheapest in the asset class due to poor corporate governance, bad employees’ relationship, despite some businesses being potentially global leaders.

Under the pressure of investors like us, regulators, and pension funds, Korean corporate have restructured themselves, they have diversified their workforce, they are tracking better when they are focused on profitability rather than market share. And they have identified as well environmentally friendly areas of growth such as EV batteries and electric car manufacturing.

All this helped the country to be the best-performing emerging-market country in 2020, adding 42%, with international investors finally paying attention to the country. And we saw a larger rating in valuation.

So clearly, ESG is more and more important, and the countries and companies that are paying attention are rewarded for that.

So we think the movement continue to accelerate, and that’s for sure something we always mention when we talk to management. And we always talk about, for instance, diversity, which is something in the past that was always a surprise for management when we mention it. But clearly what we’ve seen more recently is that all of them are looking at it and they always give us very strong answer on how they can achieve better diversity, for instance, at board level or management level.

So those changes are happening right now in emerging market. Obviously, we’re still below the level of developed markets, but the move is very, very positive for our countries.

Thank you, Laurence.

Polina, it’s safe to say that ESG has historically been more of a consideration for equity holders and I guess less important for bondholders. Is that fair? Or is it something that is changing over time?

Contrary to common belief, when the access to capital is limited, willingness to engage tends to be quite high. And if you think about EM debt, that’s where the access to capital is more limited compared to developed market debt.

Last year in particular we have been positively surprised about the amount of engagement and the speed of engagement that we witnessed from some of EM governments. To give Brazil as an example, we’ve had a response within two weeks from central bank governor on the back of our concern on deforestation risk in Brazil. And in fact, within a matter of months, we were able to, together with the European Parliament support, to achieve temporary ban on the deforestation.

Even in some more challenged jurisdictions such as companies that operate in Sub-Saharan Africa, we’ve had two-, three-hour calls with the CEO of certain mining companies discussing the human rights and what they’re implementing to address those.

So we feel that while there are challenges when it comes to dealing with certain ESG factors, there’s definitely a lot more awareness of them and willingness to engage to find the solutions.

On the fixed income market, we’ve seen also tremendous growth in the green bonds and social bonds, and those are—this is the market which is already commanding much tighter valuations than the rest of fixed income market. And we think that trend is only likely to continue.

Last but not least, where we would like to see more improvement is in areas like disclosure, transparency. And that’s in particular when it comes to some of the Chinese companies.

To Polina’s point, we actually see companies’ behaviour on the ESG side. And their willingness to engage is at the highest when the access to capital is [indiscernible].

For the corporate credit, we have observed that there is a high correlation between the credit quality and the existing of a robust ESG framework and policies among the underlying borrower. This relationship, of course, is even more relevant for any liquid strategy that has a buy-and-hold approach where the fault risk of permanent impairment of capital is ultimately our primary concerns.

Having a more direct, close relationship with a company we feel that we can influence and affect a number of factors. And there are a number of situations and examples where lenders have the ability to positively influence the borrowers and the issuers’ behaviour.

To give you a few examples, we were involved as a lender to a large utility where we have successfully lobbied the company in changing their heavy fuel to gas. In another situation, we have brought international reporting standards to the underlying local borrowers.

Great. Thank you, Mihai, and thank you, everybody, for your views.

It’s time now to move to some questions from the audience. And thankfully, we have received quite a few already, but there’s still time for you to submit your questions for the time we have remaining.

The first one I’m going to choose, I believe, will be for Polina. 2020 saw a number of high-profile sovereign restructuring stories, example, Argentina, Ecuador, et cetera. Is that a theme that you expect to continue to play out this year? Or were they one-off idiosyncratic in nature?

Thanks, Kevin. While the tail risk is higher of—a higher default rate compared to let’s say two to three years ago, we would expect the sovereign default rate to drop meaningfully in EM in 2021 compared to 2020. And in fact, we would expect it to more than half.

One of the main reasons behind it lies in who are the countries that have defaulted. And unfortunately, the likes of Argentina, the likes of Ecuadors are the countries that are often called serious defaulters, and not without a reason.

Now if you think about 2021 and the other EM high-yield countries that might be challenged, the debt-servicing discipline has been much stronger in the rest of EM communities than in those countries, where I would say COVID was one of the factors that led to debt re-profiling, but definitely not the main ones. And we would expect the recovery and the default projections to be driven by the shape of economic recovery and the policy mix.

But from what we’re seeing so far, the countries that are most likely to be affected, given the level of indebtedness, are also the countries that are very willing to conduct the orthodox policy mix and work with the authorities, such as IMF, to improve their fiscal performance. So in that sense, we would expect the numbers in default to rate terms to be substantially lower this year.

Thank you. We have another question around China which, given Richard’s earlier comments, I’ll pass to you, Richard.

And the question is around tech regulations in China. We’re beginning to see more headlines around this risk. How is that shaping your thinking for that segment?

Yeah. It’s a very common question we get from clients at the moment, really sparked off by the collapse of the Ant IPO last year, and a lot of rumours about new anti-monopoly regulation coming in in China.

Firstly I would say, I think it’s important to separate the Ant IPO from the general regulator environment. The Ant IPO, I think, very much when they issued the IPO prospective, it was only really then that regulators realized that over 30% of consumer loans were being originated through the Ant platform. And my understanding is the reason that they chose to pull that is basically because of concerns around financial stability more than anything. What they’ve done now is, they’re now requiring fintech firms to warehouse 20% of the credit risk of the loans that they originate, rather than just being a pure platform. And that will have serious implications for the fintech industry in general.

What we’ve seen since then is a lot of noise about forthcoming anti-monopoly regulation. And my sense is that’s really targeted at the two tech giants in China, namely Alibaba and Tencent. I think we would expect regulations around things like acquiring small competitors. Also, exclusivity has been an issue where Alibaba or Tencent will ask vendors to just sell through their platforms. And also, there’s issues around both Alibaba and Tencent having stakes in the same companies. So we do expect to see some regulation on those, particularly geared at curtailing those two players’ monopolistic position in the market.

Our view is that they remain very good, very strong franchises. But certainly, we think that although they’ll continue to grow, that growth will be slower as a result of this, what we expect regulations coming in the future.

Great. Thank you. Thank you, Richard.

Another question about a specific country. What is BlueBay’s view on Turkey after recent changes in the economic management team?

So I think it’s been directed BlueBay, so maybe, Polina, we’ll go to you on that one.

Thank you, Kevin. In one word, constructive. Turkey, as you know, it has been a country which economically is in a very good position when it comes to its neighbours, when it comes to the trade-oriented nature of its economy, when it comes to competitiveness of the effects.

However, the biggest challenge in Turkey has always been the lack of the orthodox policy mix. And we are very encouraged to see the change of the governor. We’re very encouraged to see a different approach, a more orthodox approach coming in.

For us, as long as that is maintained, that would underpin our constructive view. And we have changed our positioning on Turkey after that announcement. We have added our exposure and we plan to keep that that way, as long as we continue to see the orthodox steps.

Thank you. We have one more, which is, I believe, let me just read it. Valuation divergence has hit extreme levels at the country sector and currency level in 2020. What sort of opportunities did that create? And where are you feeling more wary from a valuation perspective?

And I think this is more a question on the equities side, so, Laurence, I’ll go to you on this one.

Yeah. Thanks, Kevin. Absolutely. I mean, we’ve seen one of the biggest dispersion ever in terms of performance between countries, sector, style, currencies in 2020. This is really the result of the so-called K-shaped recovery where you had COVID winners and COVID losers. So it means that now, some countries and sector are the most expensive they ever been in emerging market, while some are the cheapest they’re ever been. So if we believe that COVID will be behind us, we don’t know when but in the near future, so there’s no reason for this large divergence to continue. I would expect some of the laggards to recover.

So looking at countries, one that stands out is Taiwan. It looks very expensive; really, the most expensive they ever been. China is also close to that level. And overall, EM is not that cheap.

But actually, many countries are very attractively valued. I would highlight notably Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa are countries that are very cheap at the moment with potentially a strong growth outlook. And it could rebound in the coming months, especially with the help of the currency as well; that could do better.

It’s interesting to note that Korea, that I mentioned just before, are re-rated very much and used to be very cheap and is now above its long-term median. But I would argue that this is deserved, and we could see a continued re-rating.

In terms of sectors, same situation. Health care, consumer discretionary, IT, consumer services, consumer staples look all expensive. But on the other hand, I would highlight financials. Really off their lows, but still very cheap, as well as energy, despite the Brent already back to about $55. Still extremely attractive in terms of valuation.

And finally, value-add is worse here since record starting 20 years ago compared to growth stocks, and could start to do well, to do better, in the coming months.

So lots of opportunities in emerging markets. It’s worth noting that despite the very strong performance I mentioned earlier in 2020, only a handful of countries contributed to that performance, and namely Korean, Taiwan, China, India. And we had about 20 countries that are still well below their level before COVID, with a lot of them still down 15, 20, 25%. So lots of opportunities in asset class.

Great. We have, I believe, time for one last question. And this last question is quite a long one so please bear with me. I think it’s like three or four questions in one, but.

We’ve seen inflation rise across some, not all emerging markets, especially driven by food and also possibly energy prices going forward. How much of a risk do you think is higher inflation? Do you think this could lead to a second-round effects in some countries? And which ones? Are you expecting any fallout from this on local debt markets and monetary policy?

So maybe Polina will be best placed to give her thoughts on inflation risk in emerging markets.

Sure. When we think about inflation, we have to think about the three variables here. Firstly is the trend in inflation. Secondly is the policy response in EM to inflation problem. And thirdly is the policy response in DM to inflation threat.

Now the trend is upward sloping, and you would expect that to be the case. However, if you think about the policy response to emerging markets, or rather when it comes to emerging markets, and you look at the shape of the curves, a lot of curves are pricing in hikes to respond to the slow grind in inflation.

The question, when it comes to emerging market inflation is, at which stage it becomes a problem. And let’s think back 40 years ago when we’ve had a period of hyperinflation. How long did it take from an inflation problem to become a hyperinflation problem and ultimate trigger a strong policy response? Last time around, it lasted from late ’60s, or mid ’60s, to late ’70s. Almost 15 years was the time frame until hyperinflation became a problem. I’m not saying we’re going to wait that long here, but I want to say that there is a lag of time between the health and recovery into inflation turns into hyperinflation problem, and we’re not there yet.

And last but not least, if you think about the DM policy response, DM policy makers want to have a high inflation. In fact they’ve been—we think that they’re actually likely to wait more on the rate hikes, even with the gradual pickup in inflation, because it’s a healthy number to have a low single-digit inflation. We’re not seeing threats from inflation when it comes to the real economic recovery.

So in summary, we are monitoring the inflation threats but we don’t think we are in a year when inflation becomes a real driver of risk assets.

Thank you, Polina. One final question, which hopefully we can squeeze in. How will the U.S.-China “chip war” evolve under a Biden administration? Can China create a fully independent semiconductor industry?

Anybody want to jump in with some insights on that?

Sure. I can take that. That’s something that we have looked at. SMIC is the largest chipmaker in China. And certainly, as a government-owned entity, has been trying very hard to develop its own industry and its own technology.

At the moment, our view is that they’re about four to five years behind, and it’s very difficult for them to keep up with the likes of TSMC on the manufacturing side or ARM on the design side without using current U.S. technology, which has been effectively barred to SMIC. And we’ve seen the effect of that in terms of Huawei having to exit the smartphone industry because they can’t source the low-power advanced small nano-chips.

So the short answer is, I think it’s very difficult to see China being able to do that unless the Biden administration rolls back the sanctions, particularly in terms of U.S. technology companies exporting their capital equipment and software to enable them to develop smaller nanometer chips in the future.

Thanks. Well, unfortunately, I’m going to have to draw things to a close now, as much as I’d love to continue this discussion and answer all of the remaining questions.

All that remains is to thank Polina, Laurence, Mihai, and Richard for their very insightful comments. I’d also like to thank you all for your participation, with a particular word of gratitude to those who submitted questions. And again, apologies we couldn’t get to them all.

I hope you all agree that it’s been an interesting look at the many factors that are shaping the investment landscape in emerging markets today. As always, you can continue to look forward to more in the way of thought leadership and events from us at RBC Global Asset Management and BlueBay Asset Management. We’ll be sending a follow-up email to all attendees with links to some additional pieces we hope you find insightful.

Finally, before you leave, please rate the webinar and provide any feedback you have in the tab below.

But that’s about it from us. Thank you all and have a great rest of your day.